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I’m going to try to change the perspective and make an analogy. Maybe it’s 
not a question, it’s rather a need to put forth a request to you to once again 
explain this phrase ‘’plural pre-reflective self-awareness’’. I know your dif-
ferent texts, but in this text, in the context of collective responsibility, as I 
understood, your main effort was to show us that someone is responsible 
if there exists some kind of pre-reflective self-awareness. This is the condi-
tion, unconditional condition. First of all, when I prepared for our meeting 
today and tomorrow, I read a little Waldenfels, on Aufnehmung, and you re-
member there is nothing about collective awareness, but in Natalie Depraz, 
in her book from two years ago, Attention e Vigilance, she speaks of conjoined 
intersubjective attention. And as you know, as phenomenologists we can say 
this is always an object that implies attention. There is no attention without 
object, and in your case this object could be a situation. For example, the col-
lective responsibility involved with any random collection of strangers in 
situations that demand a multilateral action, I am interested in the relation of 
this plural pre-reflective self-awareness. Yesterday I found in Nida-Rümelin, 
he is using this Korporativverantworvung and Kooperativeverantwortung, but 
you know that for him there is only individual responsibility. Kolektivver-
antwortung is figurative. Plural pre-reflective self-awareness and the relation 
of this to time or temporality of the existence of a group - I’m interested in 
responsibility that constitutes a group. That’s why I use the analogy. I hope 
you remember the text of Moritz Schlick from 1930, ‘’Wann ist der Mensch 
Verantwortlich?’’(When is the Man Responsible?), and one of the main con-
ditions is consciousness. Much more importantly, the question when a man 
is said to be responsible, is that of when he himself feels responsible. I think 
this is a bit of a challenge that there is no responsibility if someone does not 
have consciousness of responsibility, but only if the individual feels respon-
sible. In that case, it would be good to explain whether there exists some kind 
of a cogito of the group, not just an analogy individual-collective, because that 
could be an awareness of responsibility. 
And the other example is also a complete change of perspective. This sum-
mer, one evening in one restaurant in Greece, a young American was beat-
en to death by some 12 persons in a span of some 20 seconds. They, perpe-
trators, have all been apprehended. Some of them knew each other, while 
others joined when the situation, or object in that case, arose. Since there is 
no more object, there is no group either. When, then, does the responsibility 
of the group exist? Does the fact that they were all Serbian nationals in that 
case, satisfy this plural pre-reflective self-awareness? And is that enough? 
Or is the object, in that case, that American, enough for the constitution of 
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the group? They will confirm that they acted at the same time, but are they a 
group or not? And, where can you find this plural pre-reflective self-aware-
ness in that case? Because, they acted. This is a completely different exam-
ple: they were very active, and we could still not say that they were a group. 
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The way I imagine this American case is this: clearly they were a group and 
they knew what they were doing. So then, the knowledge involved, the know-
ing what it was they were doing, the form of that self-knowledge is plural. 
The object is the victim on which harm is inflicted by means of their beating 
up that person together. And the feature in virtue of which this is an inten-
tional joint action is the plural pre-reflective self-knowledge of the agent, and 
the agent is the individuals together, a plural subject. So they together knew 
what they were doing, and knew it in the right way, and that’s the feature 
in virtue of which they did it intentionally. So the subject of the act is them. 
Not an extra entity, not an additional subject, but they together. They as one. 
That would be my description of the situation. Of course, it has nothing to 
do with nationality, background, just the intention, the feature in virtue of 
which the act is intentional, that’s plural. Let me state the ontological claim. 
This knowledge is what groups are. This is an ontological claim about sub-
jectivity, that groups are plural pre-reflective self-awareness in the very way 
in which individual subjects are singular pre-reflective self-awareness. That’s 
how you are a subject, you are a subject in virtue of your being self-aware of 
your attitudes as yours, under suitable circumstances. I want to argue that 
there is plural pre-reflective self-awareness, and I would claim there is no 
awareness without self-awareness. If you are aware of a cup of coffee, there 
is something inbuilt, and some people say that in deep meditation there is 
awareness without self-awareness. Maybe experiences of depersonalization 
are similar, but apart from such phenomena I would say that self-awareness 
is a feature of any awareness. And if it’s plural, it is a group’s. Have I under-
stood you and Moritz Schlick correctly, that the claim is that there is no re-
sponsibility without feeling responsible? Because that strikes me as a rath-
er untenable claim. I have plenty of examples where there is responsibility 
without the subject, the perpetrator, feeling responsible. 
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Ok, zu Heidegger. Ich möchte diese Gelegenheit nicht so vergehen, um Sie 
diese Frage zu stellen, die ich auch zu Dan Zahavi gestellt hat. Die betrifft 
